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Heald: Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral

RESOLVING PRIORITY DISPUTES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLATERAL
Paul Heald*
Although a goodly amount of recent commentary' provides
guidance to practitioners on the pitfalls of perfecting a security
interest in intellectual property2 collateral, and another body of
work has undertaken the laudable task of proposing reform in the
area,3 no comprehensive attempt has yet been made to help judges
resolve the complex priority disputes that arise under existing law.
In light of the increased use of intellectual property as collateral
and the concomitant rise in litigation," guidance on the resolution
of priority disputes in intellectual property collateral is sorely

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D. 1988, University of Chicago.
Thanks to Mark Anderson, Bob Rasmussen, Julian McDonnell, Jim Smith, Richard M.
Rosenberg, Paul J. N. Roy, and Barry Adler for their insightful comments on earlier drafts
of this article.
See, e.g., Thomas L. Bahrick, Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 30 (1987); Andrea M. Bond, Secured Lenders and Computerized
Borrowers: An Introductionto Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 13 HAMLiNE L. REv. 313
(1990); Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral-Patents,Trade Secrets,
Trademarks and Copyrights, in 1C SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 25A-1 (Matthew Bender, 1992); Albert M. Fenster, Security Interests in
Intellectual Property and ContractualRights, 643 CORP. L. & PRAC. 317 (1989); John L.
Mesrobian & Kenneth R. Schaefer, Secured TransactionsBased on Intellectual Property,72
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 827 (1990). See also William W. Chip, Transfers of
Copyrightsfor Security Under the New Copyright Act, 88 YALE L.J. 125 (1978).
a For the purposes of this paper, the term "intellectual property" will refer to copyrights,
patents, and trademarks. Disputes involving trade secrets, publicity rights, and the like will
not be discussed.
"See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Capwell, Secured Financingin Intellectual Property: Perfection of
Security Interests in Copyrights to Computer Programs, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1041 (1988);
Marci L. Klumb, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal Statutes
PreemptArticle 9,57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1988); Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The
Unconstitutionalityof State Motion Picture Lien Laws (OrHow Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39
AM. U. L. REV. 59 (1989); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing
and Information Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 195 (1987); Harold R. Weinberg &
William J. Woodward, Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactionsin Intellectual
Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 KY. L.J. 61 (1990); Chip, supra note 1.
4 See cases cited infra at notes 6, 105, 126.
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needed.5 For example, recent cases' find Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to be broadly preempted by federal
intellectual property law and create significant differences between
the way copyright and patent priority disputes are addressed,7
without providing a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on intellectual property preemption.' This
Article criticizes these and other cases, provides guidelines for
resolving the puzzling priority disputes that arise when intellectual
property is taken as collateral, and clearly defines the proper
contours of federal preemption.
Part I of the Article will review well-established preemption
principles, determine whether federal or state rules of decision
apply to familiar patterns of dispute involving copyright collateral,
and suggest the appropriate result in each case. The conclusions
contradict recent academic and judicial discussion of the preemption issue that suggests an inappropriately broad preemptive scope
for federal law. The key is not to examine preemption questions in
the abstract, but to identify the precise disputes that federal law
settles and leave for state law the disputes for which federal law
provides no answer. Part II applies the same method of analysis
to priority disputes involving patents as collateral and examines
whether the current disparate treatment of patents and copyrights

5 Recent decisions, see infra note 6, have resulted in a fifty percent increase in recordation
of transfers with the Copyright Office. Security Interests: Bills Would End National
Recordation of Security Interests in Copyrights, BNA BANKRupmy LAw DAILY, March 2,
1993, at 1.
6 See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (Kozinki, J. sitting by
designation) (holding that Copyright Act preempts U.C.C. regarding perfection for security
interests in films); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods. (In re AEG
Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (reiterating holding that Copyright
Act preempts U.C.C. regarding perfection for security interests in films).
t
ComparePeregrine,116 B.R. at 207 (holding that bankruptcy trustee may avoid security
interests in copyrights not recorded in federal Copyright Office) with City Bank & Trust Co.
v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) (holding that bankruptcy trustee may
not avoid security interests in patents not recorded in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
a See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that Florida
statute prohibiting use of direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls conflicts
with federal policy favoring free competition in unpatentable ideas and thus is preempted).
See also Paul Heald, FederalIntellectual PropertyLaw and the Economicsof Preemption, 76
IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991) (applying rationale of Bonito Boats to various state unfair
competition laws to determine whether they are preempted).
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is warranted. To round out the discussion, Part III evaluates the
effect of the Lanham Act on disputes over security interests taken
in trademarks.
I. PREEMPTION GENERALLY AND PRIORITY DISPUTES IN
COPYRIGHT COLLATERAL

When seeking new capital to finance yet another acquisition,
Broadcasting Conglomerate might collateralize its debt by granting
its lender a security interest in the substantial library of film
copyrights obtained from Studio X several years earlier. Or young
Jean Programmer, short of cash, may want to grant security
interests in software that she has already developed (or will
develop in the future). Unfortunately, the relatively straightforward granting of a security interest 9 may rapidly become messy as
competing claimants appear asserting superior rights to the
collateral. Who prevails in a priority dispute between secured
lenders, holders of judicial liens, and trustees-in-bankruptcy? In
order to begin sorting out the priority of such claims, a court must
first determine whether state or federal law governs each dispute.
As to copyright collateral, the answer is to be found among the
Supreme Court's decisions in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft
Boats,1012 De Sylva v. Ballentine," and United States v. Kimbell
Foods.
A. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted in some form
in all fifty states,"3 provides general rules for sorting out the
winners and losers in priority disputes over collateral, including
battles over "general intangibles" (by definition, copyrights, patents

9See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1990) (stating three basic prerequisites to the existence of a security
interest: a written agreement, value given by the secured party, and debtor's rights in the
collateral).
10 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
"1351 U.S. 570 (1956).
u 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
'1 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE xi-xii (1981).
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and trademarks).14 Because Congress has never sought generally
to federalize the field of commercial financing,15 most priority
disputes over collateral are governed by Article 9.16 Congress,
however, has addressed some specific priority issues within the
context of the Copyright Act, thereby raising the preemption issue.
Congress may override state law in several ways. First, it may
expressly preempt state law. For example, section 301 of the
Copyright Act expressly preempts "all legal and equitable rights
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified in section 106.1" Since section
10618 grants authors the exclusive right to copy, perform, display,
and prepare derivations of their works, state laws that grant
similar rights are preempted.19 Neither section 301 nor section
106, however, says anything about security interests or the rights
of lienholders, and no one has ever suggested that section 301
erases all state laws that somehow affect copyrighted works.2"
Second, Congress can impliedly preempt state law. To illustrate,
in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats,2 1 the Supreme Court
found that a state law protecting boat hulls from plug mold copying
directly conflicted with the federal patent law and was therefore
impliedly preempted. The Court held that the goals and operation
of the patent statute would be frustrated by state law protection of

'4 See U.C.C. § 9-106 & cmt. (1990).
"Even when Congress has established federal title recording systems, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §
1403 (1988) (aircraft) and 49 U.S.C. § 11303 (1988) (railroad rolling stock), it has not created
comprehensive schemes for resolving disputes over collateral. But see 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984
(marine vessels).
16 Bankruptcy laws, especially 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991) (listing
exemptions to debtor's duties and benefits), and 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)
(establishing power and status of trustee), are frequently very relevant in priority disputes;
however, the Bankruptcy Code does not set up a competing priority scheme and usually
defers to state law for substantive rules of decision.
1717 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
"17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d
897 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that state laws basing liability on mere copying of works of
authorship are preempted).
' See, e.g., Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding state
law contract claim for breach of agreement to purchase copyrighted materials not
preempted).
21489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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articles of manufacture that did not qualify for a patent.22
Similarly, section 205 of the Copyright Act seems to evidence a
congressional intent to preempt some state laws by establishing a
limited scheme for resolving several types of priority disputes over
copyright collateral. For example, Congress has determined that
a holder of a security interest in copyright collateral who records
first in the United States Copyright Office (Copyright Office)
without notice of a prior transfer should prevail over a prior
transferee.' Because a state may not contradict or undermine
congressional policy as expressed in a federal statute, a state law
requiring a different result is undoubtedly of no effect. For this
reason, section 9-312(5) of Article 9,24 which provides that a
subsequent transferee who files its interest with notice of a prior
unrecorded security interest still prevails, is clearly preempted as
applied to copyright collateral.
Section 205, however, does not cut a broad swath. It provides for
the permissive filing of security interests in copyrights and
settles two priority disputes between transferees' of interests in
a copyright: (1) when the first transferee files first in the Copyright Office (first transferee wins);27 and (2) when a subsequent
transferee for value and in good faith files first in the Copyright
Office without notice of a prior unrecorded transfer (second
transferee wins).' If neither transferee records, or if the subsequent transferee is the trustee-in-bankruptcy, or if the copyright at

" See id. at 159-60. See generally Paul Heald, FederalIntellectual PropertyLaw and the
Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991) (evaluating Bonito Boats and arguing
that the Supreme Court's preemption decisions, from an economic perspective, have been
consistent).
See infra note 41.
U.C.C.

§ 9-312(5)

(1990).

" See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1988) (providing that '[a]ny transfer of copyright ownership...
may be recorded in the Copyright Office") (emphasis added).
" Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "transfer of copyright ownership" as any
"assignment, mortgage ... conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The Register of the Copyright Office and most commentators agree that
this definition includes garden variety security interests. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra
note 3, at 205-06.
27 17 U.S.C. § 205(d).
" 17 U.S.C. § 205(eX2).
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issue is unregistered,2 section 205 provides no express answer.
A wide variety of scenarios can be imagined where the narrow
terms of section 205 provide little guidance.
For this reason, a court would not be justified in holding that in
section 205 Congress has impliedly preempted all Article 9 priority
rules, especially those that do not directly conflict with section 205.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar problem in De Sylva v.
Ballentine, ° when it considered whether the term "children" in
section 24 of the former Copyright Act included illegitimate
children.31 In holding that after the death of the author, illegitimate children maintain a right to renew the author's copyright, the
Court recognized that "[tihe scope of a federal right is, of course, a
federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to
be determined by state, rather than federal law."3 2 In the absence
of a conflict with the terms of the former Copyright Act, the Court
determined that state law should govern the construction of the
term "children.'
The approach of the Court in Bonito Boats is
consistent with De Sylva: both acknowledge the supremacy of
federal intellectual property law, but they suggest that only state
laws that actually conflict with congressional intent are preempted.
This is consistent with the general proposition that preemption is
disfavored.'
Outside the intellectual property context, the Supreme Court has
hesitated to disrupt existing state priority schemes. In United
States v. Kimbell Foods,' the Court confronted two priority
disputes, one between the Small Business Administration (SBA)

"One of the prerequisites for recordation is the registration of the copyright. 17 U.S.C.

§ 205(cX2) (1988). Since a copyright arises at the moment of fixation in a tangible form (not
at publication or registration), 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), many, if not most,
copyrights are unregistered.
3o 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
3117 U.S.C. § 24 (1952), repea/edand replacedby 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (children of the
author... shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a
further term of twenty-eight years).
2 De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 580.
Id. at 580-81.
See, eg., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973)

('[u]nless the requisite preemptive intent is abundantly clear, we should hesitate to
invalidate state and local legislation").
5 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a discussion of the case as it relates to copyright, see Capwell
supra note 3, at 1059-62.
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and a grocery wholesaler holding a lien under state law, and
another between the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) and
a repairman claiming a lien arising under state law. Although the
Court acknowledged that federal law governed the priority of the
security interests of the SBA and FmHA, it held that Article 9
should be adopted as the applicable law in the absence of any
conflict with federal policy or express congressional directive to the
contrary." Since the federal statutes establishing the SBA and
FmHA did not provide priority rules to determine the disputes at
issue, Article 9 controlled the disposition of the cases.
The opinions in Bonito Boats, De Sylva, and Kimbell Foods all
suggest that Article 9 should apply to priority disputes over
copyright collateral that are not resolved by section 205 of the
Copyright Act. Although a court would have the power to fashion
federal common-law rules to supplement the express provisions of
the Copyright Act, De Sylva and Kimbell Foods evidence the
Court's preference for adopting non-conflicting state law regimes.3 7
This approach as applied in the rest of this article will demonstrate
that recent decisions' and commentary" should not be read as
' But see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that federal
policy requires implementation of federal common law to govern federal commercial paper);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (holding that
federal policy requires implementation of federal common law to govern obligations owed to
failed federally insured financial institutions).
37 State law would only become utterly irrelevant if a court found that the Copyright Act
"occupied the field" to such a pervasive extent as to void all state regulation of copyrights.
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (finding preemption in a "scheme
of federal regulation... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the states to supplement it*). The Court has previously refused to find such a
broad preemptive intent in either the Copyright Act or the Patent Act. See Kewanee Oil v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (refusing to preempt state law regulating trade secrets);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (refusing to preempt state law regulating
copyrighted material). Neither the Copyright Act nor the Patent Act is so comprehensive
that occupation of the field can be reasonably inferred. See Heald, supra note 22, at 988
n.200.
as See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (Kozinski, J., sitting by
designation) (finding that recordation in U.S. Copyright Office, rather than filing financing
statement under Article 9 of U.C.C., is only proper method under federal law for perfecting
security interest in copyright); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods. (In re
AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Peregrinefor proposition
that Copyright Act preempts Article 9 of U.C.C. for perfection of security interests in
copyrights).
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broadly endorsing the position that even nonconflicting state laws
are preempted.
B. PRIORITY DISPUTES GOVERNED BY COPYRIGHT LAW

Section 205 of the Copyright Act resolves several important types
of priority disputes. After an examination of the content of the
federal rule, we can properly assign the untilled ground to state
law and examine how those remaining disputes should be settled.
1. FirstTransfereeFiles First. As a bedrock principle, if the first
transferee of an interest in a copyright files first in accordance with
the requirements of section 205(c), 4' it prevails against any
competing interest. For example, in January, Bank A takes a
security interest in Broadcasting Conglomerate copyrights and
immediately records; in February, Bank B takes a security interest
in the same copyrights: Bank A prevails in a dispute with Bank B
over the copyrights whether Bank B records or not.
2. Subsequent Transferee Files First. Under section 205(d),4 an
interest arising subsequent to a competing transfer will be superior
if it is recorded first under subsection (c) and it is taken in good
faith, for value, and without notice. For example, in January, Bank
A takes a security interest in Broadcasting Conglomerate's
copyrights, but does not record; in February, Bank B extends credit
to Broadcasting Conglomerate, takes a security interest in its
copyrights without notice of Bank A's interest, and records: Bank
B wins. Similarly, if Studio Y buys Conglomerate's copyrights
without knowledge of Bank A's interest and records first, Studio Y
"See, eAg., Klumb, supra note 3, at 156-58; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 3, at 20506. But see Capwell, supra note 3, at 1059-79 (suggesting the limited preemption approach

advocated here).
4
0 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1988) (requiring identification and registration of work).
41
Id. § 205(d). Section 205(d) states:
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it
is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under
subsection (c), within one month after its execution in the United States
or within two months after its execution outside the United States, or at
any time before recordation in such manner of the later transfer.
Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner,
and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of

a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier
transfer.
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would also prevail over Bank A.
C. PRIORITY DISPUTES OVER COPYRIGHT COLLATERAL GOVERNED BY
STATE LAW

A critical question, directly related to the previous discussion,
arises when the second transferee is the trustee-in-bankruptcy.42
That issue, along with other issues governed by state law, is
discussed below.
1. Trustee as Second Transferee. The debtor's trustee-inbankruptcy is arguably a subsequent "transferee" within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. Section 201(d)(1) of the Act provides
that "[the ownership of a copyright may be transferred... by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law.'
The transfer of the
debtor's assets to the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code would
seem to be a transfer made "by operation of law.'
This interpretation is supported by language in the legislative history of section
201, a section that defines ownership and mentions transfers. In
defining nonconsensual transfers, the House Judiciary Committee
excepted "[t]raditional legal actions that may involve the transfer
of ownership, such as bankruptcy proceedings,' thereby indicating that Congress considered the trustee to be a "transferee."
Finding that the trustee is a transferee does not answer the
question, however, as to whether section 205(d) governs a priority
dispute between the trustee and a prior unrecorded interest.
Section 205(d) is silent as to who prevails between two unrecorded
interests." Since section 205(d) does not say who prevails beConclusions drawn about the trustee also may be applicable to the debtor-in-possession.
Any differences between the two are irrelevant to the following discussion.
43 17 U.S.C. § 201(dX1) (1988).
"See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 205-06 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that trustee is
a section 205(d) transferee).
" H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739.
" There is one exception: when a subsequent unrecorded transferee takes with
knowledge, or in bad faith, or for no consideration, section 205(d) implies negatively that the
prior transferee should prevail regardless of its failure to file. See supra Part I.B.2. This
implication seems irrelevant as applied to the trustee, however, since under 11 U.S.C. §
544(lXa) (1988), the trustee is deemed to take for value and without notice. (The author
does not know how a trustee could fail the good faith requirement.)
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tween two unrecorded transfers, a court should apply Article 9
when the trustee seeks to avoid a security interest in a copyright
that is unrecorded under section 205(c).
The courts, however, in both Peregrine47 and AEG 48 found that
section 205(d) governed such priority disputes, holding that the
trustee could avoid security interests in copyrights that had been
filed with the California Secretary of State instead of the Copyright
Office. They found that the disputes did not involve two unrecorded interests-both courts deemed the trustee to have properly
recorded its interest as a matter of law at the time of the bankruptcy filing. This conclusion followed from the proposition that "the
debtor is assumed to have completed all steps necessary to create
the lien as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy case."4'
Since the trustee as subsequent transferee was deemed to have
recorded, both opinions held that section 205(d) governed disputes
involving bankruptcy trustees.
The courts' conclusion-that under applicable bankruptcy law the
trustee is deemed to have recorded in the Copyright Office-is
highly suspect. Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1),o the trustee assumes the status of a judicial lien creditor under state law and is
given the power to avoid all interests that are subordinate to such
a lien creditor under state law. In general, this allows the trustee
to avoid all unperfected security interests and prevents her from

116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
49 Id. at 43 (citing 4 WILLIAM COLLIER, COLER ON BANKRUPTCY
544.02 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1991)). Accord Peregrine,116 B.R. at 207 n.19. The paraphrase of Collier
in AEG is somewhat incomplete. The treatise states that "if under state law a creditor
asserting a lien by virtue of legal proceedings must file certain notices thereof, the trustee
will be deemed to have complied with such requirements." 4 COLLIER, supra 544.02
(emphasis added).
"011 U.S.C. § 544(aX) (1988). Providing that:
The trustee shall have, as ofthe commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and
powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-(1) a creditor that
extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case,
and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have
obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists ....
41
4
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avoiding perfected interests.51 In order to place the trustee in the
position of a judicial creditor, she will be deemed to have complied
with all statutory requirements necessary to perfect her lien under
state law. 2 For example, California requires that in order to levy
on real property, the lien must be recorded "with the recorder of the
county where the real property is located."' So, a trustee of a
debtor's California real property will be deemed to have recorded
its hypothetical lien in the county office."
Therefore, if state law requires that a judicial lien creditor make
a filing in the Copyright Office, then the trustee will be deemed to
have done so. Both the courts in AEG and Peregrine fail to note
that no such filing is necessary under California law to perfect a
lien on intellectual property collateral.' In California, as in most
states,' a lien creditor may execute a lien on a copyright or a

"1 See U.C.C. § 9-301(lXb) (1990) ([A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to
rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected.*);
U.C.C. § 9-312(5Xa) (1992) (providing that priority between conflicting security interests in
the same collateral shall be determined by their "rank[ing] according to priority in time of
filing or perfection.").
"See 4 COLLIER, supra note 49, '1544.02.
53 CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 700.015(a) (West 1987).
" See Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
"See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 700.170 (West 1987) (requiring nothing more than personal
service by levying officer in case of levy on a general intangible).
" See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-81 to -86 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 11 12166, 12-201 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
Interestingly, most state law procedures that permit execution and levy by the sheriff
(typically) on copyright collateral may be void. In Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528 (1852), the
Court suggested in dicta that a creditor could only foreclose on a copyright through a
creditor's bill in equity compelling the transfer of the copyright in accordance with federal
copyright law. Id. at 531. The Court noted that federal law required any transfer of an
ownership interest in a copyright to be in writing and signed in the presence of two
witnesses. Id. at 532. Equity could be invoked to compel the transfer. Although federal law
at that time provided for recording of transfers of copyright interests, see Act of June 30,
1834, ch. 157, 4 Stat. 728 (1834), the court did not hint that recordation would be necessary
to effect foreclosure. Stephens, 55 U.S. at 531-32. Since an unrecorded transfer is
enforceable as between the parties thereto, see DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184 (D. Fla. 1962), it would be odd to require recordation as part of the process of
execution and levy. Viewed through the lens of Stephens, the trustee would be deemed to
have successfully prosecuted a creditor's bill in equity, rather than having taken the legal
steps necessary for execution and levy. Without a recordation requirement, however, Article
9 still governs the attempts by the trustee to invoke its status to avoid other unrecorded
interests.
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patent without making any filing at all." Research reveals no
state that requires a judicial lien creditor to file in the Copyright
Office in order to foreclose on a copyright.
This is not surprising given that foreclosure on federal intellectual property collateral is wholly a matter of state law." In Republic
Pictures Corp. v. Security-FirstNationalBank59 the Second Circuit
held that a federal court is without jurisdiction to entertain a
foreclosure action on a copyright mortgage, leaving the foreclosure
question wholly to state law.'o Special interests have urged
Congress to amend the Copyright Act to regulate copyright
foreclosures, but to no avail. 1
Since the trustee stands in the shoes of a judicial lien creditor,
and since such a creditor does not have to record its interest in the
Copyright Office in order to perfect its lien under state law, then
the trustee should not be deemed to have recorded its interest in
the Copyright Office. If the trustee's interest is unrecorded and the
interest of the prior transferee is unrecorded, then section 205 is
silent as to who prevails. Article 9 properly speaks in the face of
such silence. 62 Therefore, the absence of state laws requiring
judicial lien creditors to file in the Copyright Office is dispositive of
the question whether state or federal law governs a priority dispute
between the trustee-in-bankruptcy and a prior unrecorded transfer.
Interestingly, Article 9 priority rules do not mandate a different
ultimate result than that found in AEG and Peregrine. Under

7

In California, an execution lien, requiring no filing, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 700.170
(West 1987), is available to a lien creditor with its eyes on copyright collateral, but a
judgment lien, which does require a filing with the California Secretary of State, see id. §§
697.510, 697.590 (Supp. 1993), is not available for intellectual property collateral, see id. §
697.530 (West 1987) (listing property subject to judgment lien).
See Bramson, supra note 1, §§ 25A.05, 25A.40-25A.42.
197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952); see also Bramson, supra note 1, § 25A.05.
o For an example of execution on a patent, see Coldren v. American Milling Research &
Dev. Inst., 378 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. App. 1978) (holding that patent rights are available to a
judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment through proceedings supplementary to execution).
61 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738 ("Representatives of motion picture producers have argued that
foreclosures of copyright mortgages should not be left to varying State laws, and that the
statute should establish a Federal foreclosure system. However, the benefits of such a
system would be of very limited application, and would not justify the complicated statutory
and62procedural requirements that would have to be established.").
See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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section 9-301(1)(b) of Article 9, a lien creditor has priority over an
unperfected security interest.'
Therefore, the trustee has the
power under 11 U.S.C. § 544(1)(a) to avoid any unperfected
interests. Were the prior transfers in both AEG and Peregrine
unperfected? Both prior transferees in those cases were secured
creditors who filed financing statements in the state office designated for general intangibles,6 but not in the Copyright Office.
Unfortunately for the secured parties, Article 9 specifies the
Copyright Office as the proper place to record and perfect an
interest in a copyright. Section 9-302(3)(a) provides that the "filing
of a financing statement otherwise required by this Article is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property
subject to a statute or treaty of the United States ...

which

specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this
Article.'
The Official Comment to section 9-302 identifies the
former Copyright Act as establishing an alternative filing system
for security interests in copyrights.'
Therefore, filing in an
otherwise proper state office is "not necessary or effective" to perfect
an interest in copyright collateral.6 7 Since the secured parties in
AEG and Peregrine failed to file in the only locale permissible
under Article 9, their interests were unperfected and avoidable by
the trustee-in-bankruptcy.
This conclusion does not moot the discussion of whether federal
or state law should provide the rule for deciding cases involving the
trustee. If federal law is erroneously held to apply, then state
legislatures are handcuffed by the Supremacy Clause." Any
attempt by a state to overrule the results in AEG and Peregrine
would be preempted. On the other hand, since Article 9 controls,
a state maintains the power to tinker with the priority relationship
63 U.C.C. § 9-301(lXb) (1990) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien
creditor before the security interest is perfected.").
See U.C.C. § 9-106 & cmt. (1990) (defining copyrights, patents, and trademarks as
general intangibles).
' U.C.C. § 9-302(3Xa) (1990).
"U.C.C. § 9-302 & cmt. 8 (1990).
See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 19:9, at 544-45
(1965) (asserting that federal filing systems are generally assumed to be exclusive).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 ("the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land").
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between lien creditors and those who provide notice of a security
interest by filing with the state. While recognizing that a state
filing is inadequate to defeat a transfer recorded in the Copyright
Office, a state may nonetheless wish to grant priority to someone
who files with the state over a judicial lien creditor or other secured
parties who make later state filings."
In fact, this is the approach suggested recently in a preliminary
report drafted by the American Bar Association Task Force on
Security Interests in Intellectual Property (ABA).70 Under the
preliminary ABA proposal, a "mixed approach" is suggested that
would require a state filing to establish priority "against lien
creditors, secured creditors, and all third-parties other than
subsequent purchaser/assignees for value, against whom the federal
filing would be required to establish priority."7 1 In order to
achieve this end, section 9-302 would have to be redrafted to make
a state filing "effective" for the purposes suggested above. Without
commenting on the wisdom of this approach, it must be noted that
a state could not effect the change in the face of a finding that
section 205 of the Copyright Act preempts Article 9 with respect to
the trustee. This is, of course, the holding of AEG and Peregrine.
The issue of what law controls, therefore, remains critical.
2. UnregisteredCopyrights. A security interest in an unregistered copyright cannot be recorded under section 205 of the
Copyright Act.7 2 All priority disputes between good faith transferees of unregistered copyrights should be governed by Article 9
because, as noted above, section 205 is silent as to disputes
between unrecorded transferees. Imagine the following dispute:
(1) BankA lends money to an author on January 1 and enters into
a security agreement with the author on February 15, taking as
collateral the author's unregistered copyright in a videotaped

" The mere existence of a federal filing system does not impliedly preempt and void a
state recording scheme. See Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906) (upholding state regulation
requiring recording of sale of patent rights in face of federal patent recording system).
" Bamberger, et al., Preliminary Report of the ABA Task Force on Security Interests in
Intellectual Property (ABA Business Law Section 1992) (on file with author). The author
would like to note that he is not a member of the task force.
1 d. at 14, 20.
¢' 17 U.S.C. § 205(cX2) (1988) ("Recordation... gives all persons constructive notice...
only if... registration has been made for the work.*).
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incident. Bank A makes both state and federal filings as to the
collateral. (2) Bank B lends money to the author on January 15
and enters into a security agreement with the author on February
1. Bank B makes no filings. (3) Joe Victim, whom the author
struck with his car eighteen months earlier, obtains a judgment
lien on all the author's copyrights on March 1. (4) TV Station pays
$15,000 for the photographs and copyrights on April 1 without
knowledge of the banks' security interests or Joe Victim's lien. (5)
The author goes bankrupt on July 15, and all her copyright
interests are transferred to the trustee of the estate-in-bankruptcy.
A dispute erupts over who has superior rights in the collateral.
The relative strength of the positions of these five claimants can
be ranked as follows (with one plausible exception to be discussed
momentarily):
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

TV Station
Joe Victim
Trustee
Bank B
BankA

Under section 9-301(1)(d), 3 TV Station, a good faith transferee
for value, prevails over Banks A and B, who are unperfected
secured parties. Even though Bank A filed with both the state and
the Copyright Office, its interest is arguably unperfected. Its
federal recordation is a nullity under 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) because the
copyrights were unregistered. Furthermore, its state filing is not
"effective to perfect [its] security interest" under section 9-302(3)(a)
of Article 9.74 TV Station prevails over both Joe Victim and the
Trustee under the laws of most states which give bona fide
purchasers of personal property before levy priority over judicial

7 U.C.C. § 9-301(lXd) (1990) ("[Ain unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of... in the case of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowledge of the
security
interest and before it is perfected.").
74
But see discussion supra pp. 28-29. See also discussion of why a state filing as to a
registered federal copyright is ineffective, in text accompanying notes 64-67.
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lien creditors. 5
If TV Station dropped out of the picture, Joe Victim would have
rights superior to all other claimants. His judicial lien would prime
7
the unperfected interests of the banks under section 9-301(lb). 1
In the contest with his fellow lien creditor, the Trustee, Joe prevails
as having established his lien first. Note that if Joe's lien arose
within the 90-day preference period prior to the bankruptcy filing,
his lien would be avoidable by the Trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 547.
If TV Station and Joe are left out of the dispute, the Trustee as
judicial lien creditor prevails over the unperfected interests of the
banks under section 9-301(1)(b)." As between the banks, Bank B
prevails over Bank A even though Bank A extended credit first.
Under section 9-312(5)(b) of Article 9, "[slo long as conflicting
security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority "
Attachment cannot occur until the debtor has signed the
security agreement.79 Since Bank B was the first to obtain a
signed security agreement, its interest attached first and its rights
in the collateral are superior to Bank A's.
Interestingly, Bank A can make a credible argument that it
should be ranked first instead of last. Under section 9-302(3)(a), its
state filing is ineffective if "a statute.., of the United States...
specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this Article
for filing the security interest."' The Copyright Act does not
specify any place to file against an unregistered copyright, registration being a prerequisite to valid recordation. Therefore, by the
terms of Article 9 itself, Bank A's state filing may be effective to
perfect its interest. If Bank A's interest is perfected, Bank A would
" See, eg., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5202(a) (McKinney 1978) ("[wlhere a judgment
creditor has delivered an execution to a sheriff... (its rights] are superior... to the rights
of any transferee of the debt or property, except: a transferee who acquired the debt or
property for fair consideration before it was levied upon'). See also Fleming v. Thompson,
343 A.2d 599 (Del. 1975) (holding that, until levy by sheriff, judgment debtor has power to
convey title to good faith purchaser for value) (citing U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990)).
76U.C.C. § 9-301(lXb) (1990) ("[Aln unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected.").
Id,

U.C.C. § 9-312(5b) (1990).
9See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1990) ("A security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless... the debtor has
signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral.*).
8o U.C.C. § 9-302(3Xa) (1991).
's
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prevail over all other claimants.
3. Rights of UnperfectedSecured Parties(RegisteredCopyrights).
If a copyright has been registered, but a dispute arises between two
unperfected secured parties, the first analysis above between Bank
A and Bank B applies. The party whose interest attaches first has
priority. If a copyright has been registered, but a dispute arises
between an unperfected secured party and a lien creditor, the first
analysis above between Joe Victim and the banks applies. The lien
creditor prevails. In a dispute between the trustee and an
unperfected secured party, the trustee prevails."'
4. After-Acquired Property. What if Jean Programmer wants to
use her fluctuating inventory of computer software as collateral for
a business loan? She can certainly grant an interest in software
she will create or otherwise obtain in the future, 2 but it will not
look very attractive to a lender unless that interest can be perfected. An unperfected interest is subordinate to the interest of a lien
creditor, and more importantly, to the trustee of Jean's estate
should she go bankrupt.
A consensus' exists that a future interest in a copyright cannot
be perfected under section 205(c)(1) of the Copyright Act because
"[r]ecordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all
persons constructive notice... only if... it would be revealed by
a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the
work..." ("specific identification requirement")." Since the title
or registration number of a work is not knowable with certainty
until it is created, proper recordation for the purposes of section
205(d) cannot be made in a future work. In other words, the
priority accorded a transferee who records first in the Copyright
Office is unavailable for future copyrights.
Financiers of copyright inventory need not despair utterly,
however. Until the copyright is registered (if ever), a state filing

"' See supra Part I.C.1.
See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1990) (MA] security agreement may provide that any or all
obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral.").
3

See, e.g., Chip, supra note 1, at 131.

17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1988) (recordation gives constructive notice only if document
identifies work such that it can be located by reasonable search).
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may be effective perfection. As noted below," Article 9 only
requires a federal filing when a place for such a filing is specified
by federal statute. The Copyright Act does not specify a place to
file against future works; therefore, one could credibly argue that
a state filing against future works would be effective, although
subject to defeasance by subsequent registration (which is by no
means inevitable).
This conclusion is bolstered by the policies underlying section 205
of the Copyright Act. Section 205 was enacted to increase the value
of copyrights (thereby enhancing creative incentives) by making
them more alienable.' A more efficient market for copyrights is
created when a purchaser can perfect its claim to title by recording
the transfer. Predictability increases and credit becomes more
available. Although not comprehensive, section 205 improves the
marketability of copyrights by allowing for the recordation of
security interests and by making title more certain. Allowing
security interests in after-acquired copyright collateral would in no
way upset this system and, in fact, would facilitate the financing of
the creative enterprise. Without a doubt, a shipbuilder can finance
its operations by granting security interests in boats it will build in
the future. 7 A moviemaker should be able to finance a film by
granting a security interest in the copyright of the as yet unregistered film. To the extent that recognizing security interests in
after-acquired property increases wealth, federal intellectual
property policies would be advanced rather than hindered by giving
effect under Article 9 to the federal filing.'
In conclusion, a filing as to after-acquired copyrights should
enable the secured party to prime the interests of any judicial

See infra Part H.C.2.
See Charles Shafer, Creditor'sRights Issues in CopyrightLaw: Conflict and Resolution,
11 U. BALT. L. REv. 406 (1982).
87 See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1990) (MtA] security agreement may provide that any or all
obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral.").
' See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that state
regulation of intellectual property is preempted when it clashes with the federal patent
statute's balance between public right and private monopoly); Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954). For an interesting discussion of whether permitting security interests is wealth
maximizing, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, SECuRITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 31-34 (1987).
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lienors, the trustee-in-bankruptcy, and any unperfected secured
creditors.
II. PRIORITY DISPUTES IN PATENT COLLATERAL
Like the Copyright Act, federal patent law sets forth a filing
system and a rudimentary scheme for resolving priority disputes.8 Section 261 provides that:
[an assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within
three months from its date or prior to the date of
such subsequent purchase or mortgage.'
As discussed earlier, federal provisions control whenever an
actual conflict between state and federal law is presented. 9 ' No
legislative history or other evidence exists of congressional intent
92
to preempt the entire operation of state law as it affects patents.
In fact, in 1906, the Supreme Court held that a state regulation
requiring recordation of the sale of a patent right did not violate
the predecessor to 35 U.S.C. § 261.' Therefore, state law properly
has a role as long as it does not conflict with the federal framework.
A. DISPUTES GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW

Section 261 of the Patent Act decides a wider range of priority
disputes than does its copyright counterpart.
1. Recorded Assignments. A recorded "assignment, grant or
conveyance" has priority over any subsequent interests and any

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
9oId.
1

See supra Part I.A

Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (holding that patent law does not preempt
state law contract rules effecting the patent licenses).
"See Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906).
2See
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prior unrecorded interests."
A traditional security interest
qualifies as an "assignment" for the purposes of section 261.9 In
Waterman v. MacKenzie," the Supreme Court held that a security
interest was an assignment for the purposes of federal patent law,
and therefore, a secured party had standing to bring a suit for
infringement.97 No doubt exists that a properly recorded security
interest in a patent confers priority to the secured party. This
status is available to outright purchasers of patent rights, and
probably also to judicial lienors,9" who record.
2. Unrecorded Assignments. Unlike the Copyright Act, the
Patent Act resolves most disputes between parties who have not
recorded their interests. Under the last-in-time rule of section 261,
an assignee or purchaser without notice and for good consideration
primes all previously unrecorded interests." Even if the last
assignee has not recorded, all previous unrecorded interests are
rendered nullities against it.1"
Conversely, an assignee or

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
See CMS Indus. v. L.P.S. Int'l, 643 F.2d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Agreements
transferring patent rights must be either assignments or licenses."); 5 EARNEsT B. LipscOMB
III, LMSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 19:32 (3d ed. 1984). Cf 37 C.F.R. § 1.331(b) (1992)
(authorizing recording of "mortgage, lien [or] incumbrance").
6 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
9 Id. at 258-61 (describing the agreement with the debtor as "a mortgage" and a
'conveyance made to secure the payment of a debt, upon condition that it should be avoided
by the subsequent payment of that debt at a time fixed*).
" 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b) (1992) permits the recording of liens that "affect the title of the
patent or invention to which it relates." But see In re Refusal of Assignment Branch to
Record Attorney's Lien, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1446 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1988) (upholding refusal
to record passive attorney's lien that gave attorney mere right to retain client's papers, but
not to encumber title). The author has discovered no cases discussing the possibility of
recording a judicial lien on a patent.
See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating rule
that purchaser without notice of equitable claim takes entire patent ownership, unencumbered by the equitable claim), cert. denied, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5092 (U.S. 1993); CMS Indus.
v. L.P.S. Intl, 643 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981) (Markey, J.) (holding that unrecorded agreement
transferring patent rights is ineffective against purchaser for value without notice from the
record owner).
1
o0FilmTec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573 (holding that section 261 "provides that the bona fide
purchaser for value cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has failed to record); Thomas
v. Tomco Acquisitions, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 431,435 (E.D. Wisc. 1991) (holding that bona fide
purchaser may "enlist § 261 to void otherwise valid, yet unrecorded assignment").
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purchaser who takes with knowledge "constructive or actual"1 °1
of a previous interest takes subject to that interest. 1°2
The last-in-time rule and the good-faith-purchaser requirement
resolve a wide variety of possible disputes over patent collateral.
B. DISPUTES GOVERNED BY STATE LAW

Application of state law is limited to priority disputes involving

unrecorded lienors and a narrow band of other unrecorded security
interests.
1. The Trustee and Unrecorded Security Interests. Section 261

provides that an "assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable

consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded."0 3 A trustee
seeking to avoid an unrecorded security interest must claim priority
as a subsequent "purchaser or mortgagee."'" Both courts that
have considered the question have held that the trustee is neither
a purchaser nor a mortgagee for the purposes of section 261.105

101See Magnuson Indus. v. Co-Rect Prods., Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 652, 657 (D. Minn.

1981) (holding constructive notice will suffice) (citing 4 A. W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 341, at 370 (2d ed. 1965)).
12
o See Taylor Engines, Inc. v. All Steel Engines, 192 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding
that assignment of patent to purchaser with knowledge of third party's equitable claim on
patent does not cut off claims of third party); Tomco Acquisitions, 776 F. Supp. at 431
(holding that purchaser with notice of prior unrecorded assignment has no greater rights
than original assignee); Magnuson Indus., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 652.
103 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
104 For the reason discussed in Part I.C.I., the trustee will not be deemed to have
recorded her interest in the Patent Office because state law does not require such a filing in
order to perfect a judicial lien. Cf 5 EARNEST B. LIPScOMB, III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 19:34 (3d ed. 1984) (providing that state proceeding is valid to transfer complete
or equitable title to patent right to satisfy creditor's judgment); McClaskey v. HarbisonWalker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1943) (holding that legal representative of
assignee is authorized to assign patent rights to purchaser at sheriffs sale); Coldren v.
American Milling Research & Dev. Inst., Inc., 378 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that judgment creditor may gain access to patent rights through proceedings supplemental
to execution).
1
See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782-83 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1988) (finding that it is unnecessary to record security interest to be protected against
trustee); In re Transportation Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985)
(holding that trustee is not a bona fide purchaser but a lien creditor who can find relief in
the U.C.C.); Cf National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 206 n.17 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) ("[Tlhe Patent Act
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Legislative history is of no help in construing the term "purchaser
or mortgagee," 106 nor is that term-unlike "transferee" in the
Copyright Act-a defined term. Section 261 appears to be silent as
to who prevails in a priority dispute between the trustee and an
unperfected party. Therefore, whether the trustee can avoid the
unrecorded interest of a secured party under 11 U.S.C. § 544(1)(a)
is a question for state law.
Under section 9-301(b) of Article 9, the trustee will prevail if the
security interest is unperfected. Normally, a security interest in a
general intangible, such as a patent, 0 7 is perfected by a central
filing in the state of the debtor's chief executive office." s Yet, a
state filing is ineffective if a federal statute "specifies a place of
filing different from that specified" in Article 9.'° As noted
previously,110 the Official Comment to section 9-302(3)(a) gives
the Copyright Act (along with statutes regulating aircraft and
railroad rolling stock) as an example of a federal filing system that
must be complied with to perfect a security interest. Interestingly,
although patents and copyrights are elsewhere mentioned together
in Article 9,11 a reference to the patent recordation system is
conspicuously absent from the Comment to section 9-302(3)(a).
Did the drafters of Article 9 intend for state filings to perfect
interests in patents, but federal filings to perfect interests in
copyrights? Given the similarities in the two types of collateral and
the ability to record interests under both federal acts, a plausible
explanation must be offered to justify disparate treatment. One
explanation might lie in the different indexing systems used in the
Copyright and Patent Offices. Transfers recorded in the Copyright

specifically applies only to 'subsequent purchaser(s] [and] mortgagee[sl.' 35 U.S.C. § 261.
Lien creditors are neither.").
' See Klumb, supra note 3, at 150 (stating that [the legislative history of the Patent
Act is silent with respect to whether the Act's assignment provision encompasses security
interestse).
10 7
See U.C.C. § 9-106 & cmts. (1990) (providing that "'Cg]eneral intangibles' means any
personal property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper,
documents,
instruments, and money).
1
Id. § 9-103(3).
lId. § 9-302(3Xa).
"0 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
1 See U.C.C. §§ 9-104, -106 & cmts. (1990) (comparing filing provisions applicable under
copyright and patent laws).
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Office are filed under the debtor's name 12 and the title of the
work;"13 assignments recorded in the Patent Office are only filed
under the patent registration (or application) number. 14 In other
words, a creditor can conduct a search under the debtor's name in
the Copyright Office, but not in the Patent Office. This makes
checking the copyright assets of a debtor much easier. The
copyright system looks more like the type of filing system established for other sorts of collateral under Article 9.1 For this
reason, perhaps, the drafters of Article 9 hesitated to employ the
Patent Office as the exclusive place to perfect a security interest.
One of the principal drafters, however, states that interests in
copyrights and patents should be perfected in the same manner:
by a federal filing. 1 ' Of section 261 of the Patent Act and the
predecessor117 to section 205 of the Copyright Act, Professor
Gilmore stated, [I]t seems to be generally assumed that the federal
filing systems are exclusive, and it is surely desirable that they
should be.""" Although he does not note any differences in the
indexing systems, his statements provide some guidance on
whether the absence of a reference to patents in the Official
Comment to section 9-302 is significant. If patents are treated like
copyrights, then the trustee can avoid any secured interest not
recorded in the Patent Office, whether a filing was made at the
state level or not."9
Conflicts between secondary sources, however, should not draw
attention away from the clear language of section 302(3)(a) of
Article 9. Under this section, the Patent Office is the exclusive
118 Confirmed through Copyright Office (telephone interview with Robert Colton,
Document Specialist, United States Copyright Office (July 30, 1993)).
11 The same is true for interests in aircraft and railroad rolling stock which are also
mentioned
in the Official Comment to § 9-302.
11
4 Confirmed through Patent Office (telephone interview with Sedley Pyne, Assignment
Branch, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Nov. 12, 1993)).
"5 See U.C.C. §§ 9-401, -402 (1990) (Section 401 states that to perfect a security interest,
one must file a financing statement in the proper state or county office or both. Section 402
provides for the filing of a financing statement, enumerates formal requisites of the
statement, and sets out the sufficient form.).
ne 1 GRANT GILMORE, SEcuRiTY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 19:9, at 542-46

(1965).

n1 See 17 U.S.C § 30 (1976), repealed by 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
11 1 GILMORE, supra note 116, at 544-45.
n9 See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
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place to perfect a security interest if the Patent Act "specifies a
place of filing different from that specified in this Article for filing
of the security interest.""2 As long ago as 1891, the Court made
it clear that the Patent Act specified a place for the filing of
security interests in patents. 2 1
The language of section 9302(3Xa) therefore suggests the conclusion that a state filing is
ineffective to perfect a security interest in a patent, thereby
allowing the trustee to avoid such an unperfected interest under 11
U.S.C. § 544(a). Because the scope of the trustee's power as lien
creditor is controlled by state law, a state could overturn this result
by amending section 9-302.1"
For the above reasons, the decisions in City Bank & Trust Co. v.
Otto Fabric, Inc.12 and In re Transportation Design & Tech.,
Inc."24 are quite suspect. Both cases speak in general terms
about the scope of section 261 of the Patent Act, conclude that it
does not totally preempt state law, and then blithely hold without
further discussion against the trustee in favor of the secured party
who has only made a state law filing. Although they recognize, and
rightly so, that Article 9 is not wholly preempted, they never
analyze how the priority dispute should be resolved under state
law."2 As noted earlier in the copyright context, to say that
federal law does not apply is not to say that the trustee loses.
Since section 9-302 renders a state law filing as to a patent
"ineffective," the secured creditors in both Otto Fabric and In re
TransportationDesign were unperfected. Therefore, they should
have lost to the trustee as judicial lien creditor under section 9301(1)(b).
Other lienors should be treated the same as the trustee. If a lien
arises prior to recordation in the Patent Office of a security
interest, it should have priority in the collateral.
120 U.C.C. § 9-302(3Xa) (1990).

" Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); see also supra notes 95-97 and
accompanying text.
1 It is important to recognize that the priority battle is determined by state law, see
supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text, in order to maintain the flexibility of response by
state legislatures.
83 B.R. 780 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
48 BR. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
uSee Otto Fabric,83 B.R. at 780; In re TransportationDesign & Tech., 48 B.R. at 638-
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2. Multiple Non-Bona-Fide Unperfected Parties. One could
imagine another fact situation, albeit unusual, that would fall
through the cracks of section 261 of the Patent Act. What if Donee
receives a gratuitous assignment of a patent right from Inventor,
and then Bank extends credit to Inventor and takes a security
interest in the patent with notice of the previous assignment, and
neither Donee nor Bank records? Under section 261 of the Patent
Act, neither an unrecorded donee nor a mortgagee with notice has
any express status. Therefore, state law fills the gap. Presumably
then, the Bank would prevail under section 9-301(1)(d) which
provides that an unperfected security interest in a general intangible is superior to the interest of someone who does not give value.
The imaginativeness of this hypothetical demonstrates in the
negative the broad variety of disputes that federal law does settle.
3. After-Acquired Property. The discussion of after-acquiredproperty clauses in the copyright context should be equally
applicable to patents. Although the statute might be read broadly
to permit filing as to future interests, as a practical matter it
cannot be done because there is no indexing by debtor in the Patent
Office.
III. PRIORITY DISPUTES IN TRADEMARK COLLATERAL

The extent to which priority disputes in trademark collateral are
governed by federal law is difficult to determine. All five courts
considering the question have determined that security interests in
trademarks are perfected by state filings and priority disputes are
governed by Article 9.126 The opinions, however, are unsatisfactory, particularly in their weak attempts to distinguish trademarks
from patents.
Section 1060 of the Lanham Act, 27 which governs the assignment of trademarks, is strikingly similar to section 261 of the

' Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992);
In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re C.C. & Co.,
Inc., 86 B.R. 485 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); The Creditors' Comm. of TR-3 Indus. v. Capital
Bank (In re TR-3 Indus.), 41 B.R. 128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); Roman Cleanser Co. v.
National Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984), affd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
1" 15 U.S.C. j 1060 (1988).
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Patent Act:
A registered mark... shall be assignable with the
goodwill of the business in which the mark is used.
...
Assignments shall be by instruments in writing
duly executed.... An assignment shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice, unless it is recorded in
the Patent and Trademark Office within three
months of the date thereof or prior to such subsequent purchase.' 28
Obviously, the critical question is whether an assignment under
section 1060 includes the granting of a security interest. In
Waterman v. Mackenzie,"2 the Court made clear that for the
purposes of the Patent Act, the granting of a security interest was
an assignment. No appellate cases, however, discuss whether the
term "assignment" should be construed in the same way for
purposes of the Lanham Act. The term is not defined, and the
legislative history is silent on the question."
Since Congress enacted the Lanham Act well after the Court's
decision in Waterman, a weak inference could be drawn that it3
intended the term to have the meaning given it in Waterman.11
This inference is strengthened by the fact that Congress created a
single office to regulate both patents and trademarks, the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO does accept and file
documents creating security interests in trademarks.1 32 If the
grant of a security interest in a trademark is an assignment, then,
as under the Patent Act, a wide variety of disputes are governed by
federal law."

138 U.S. 252 (1891).

, 8oSee Capwell, supra note 3, at 160.
'-' Id. at 162.

See Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 782 n.7 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1992) (holding that although PTO accepts and files documents indicating grant of
security interest in copyright, federal trademark law does not preempt U.C.C. provisions for
perfection of security interest through filing of financing statement).
' See supranotes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing scope of clause in Patent Act
governing assignments).
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When it enacted section 1060, Congress was well aware of the
long-standing common-law prohibition against "assignments in
gross." Trademark rights have never been transferable apart from
the goodwill of the business or product they represent.18' For
example, the sale of a trademark is void unless the assets necessary to maintain the goodwill of the product or business symbolized
are sold along with it.1" If Nabisco sells its "Oreo" trademark,
it must transfer the recipes necessary to create the creamy filling
and cookie wafers, any trade secrets necessary to create the
product, and any unique or otherwise unavailable equipment
necessary to the cookie's production. Not all collateral assets need
be sold, however. In In re Roman Cleanser Co.,1" the Sixth
Circuit held that the sale of a trademark for cleaning products,
accompanied by the sale of its formulas and customer lists, but not
non-essential equipment and machinery used in making the
products, was a valid assignment. The buyer acquired the means
to maintain the quality of the goods produced under the transferred
trademark. Not surprisingly, a creditor may not levy on a trademark standing by itself."7 The common-law rule was designed
to reduce the likelihood that the sale of a trademark would result
in lower quality goods and services than consumers had come to
expect.
For this reason, section 1060 forbids any assignment of a
trademark apart from its goodwill. The section certainly applies to
sales of trademarks, and in that respect merely embodies the
common-law rule. Given Congress's adoption of the common-law
rule, section 1060 would also impliedly forbid the creation of a
security interest in a trademark without the concomitant creation
of an interest in other tangibles (e.g., real property, patented
machinery, customer lists) and intangibles (formulas, recipes,
patents) necessary to maintain the goodwill associated with the

1 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAiR COMPETITION § 18.01[2] (3d ed.
1992) (summarizing doctrine that trademark cannot be assigned apart from goodwill it

symbolizes).
u Id. at §§ 18.05(1], 18.09(1]; see also Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257
(C.C.PA. 1978) (voiding sale of trademark without business by secured party who foreclosed
on its interest in the trademark).
802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
1

Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1984).
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mark.""3 This does not mean, however, that the PTO is the
proper place to record a security interest in a trademark, nor does
it mean that the priority provisions of section 1060 should resolve
disputes in trademark collateral.
Sometimes, a security interest in a trademark cannot be
perfected without perfecting a security interest in (or otherwise
acquiring) the sorts of tangibles and intangibles mentioned
above.13 Federal law makes no provision for the perfection of
security interests in any of the underlying sorts of collateral140
that may have to accompany the valid perfection of an interest in
some trademarks. Knowing that any number of state law filings as
to formulas, trade secrets, machinery, and other underlying
collateral might be necessary to perfect a security interest in a
related trademark, why would Congress intend to create a federal
filing requirement? As things presently stand, one cannot examine
the PTO files and determine with certainty whether a security
interest in a trademark has been perfected or not. A security
agreement may have been filed, but it is of no effect unless state
law filings necessary to transfer concomitant interests in the
trademark's goodwill have been made. Therefore, a full review of
the relevant state files is necessary in order to determine perfection.
Of course, some trademarks may not require any state law
filings,1 4 1 yet the ultimate question here is whether the ambiguous term "assignment" in section 1060 should be interpreted to
include security interests or just outright sales. Given the
inevitability of state law filings because of common-law trademark
doctrine, of which Congress was well aware, the term should not be
construed to encompass security interests, even though the
wordings of section 261 of the Patent Act and section 1060 of the

" See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that "good will"
requirement is satisfied by transfer of formulas and customer lists along with trademark).
' See MCCARTHY, supra note 134, § 18.01[7] ("[T]here should never be a security interest
in the bare trademark alone, divorced from good will.").
140With the exception of patents, copyrights, airplanes, and railroad rolling stock. See

supra note 15.
14 For example, a trademark for a paint whose formula is not a trade secret.
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Lanham Act are similar. 142 Congress knew that patents and
trademarks are different in significant ways. Constructive notice
of a security interest in a patent can be given by recording in the
PTO; therefore, Congress probably intended for priority disputes in
patent collateral to be resolved under the priority scheme set forth
in 35 U.S.C. § 261. A security interest in a trademark, however,
often cannot be perfected merely by filing in the PTO because of the
need to perfect interests in other collateral necessary to maintain
the goodwill of the mark. Therefore, it is less likely that Congress
intended for priority disputes between secured parties and lien
creditors to be decided under the ambiguous terms of 15 U.S.C.
1060.
Although the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code is absolutely irrelevant in determining the scope of federal
preemption of state law,1 3 neither the text of sections 9-104 or 9302 of Article 9 and accompanying comments, nor Professor
Gilmore's treatise, " suggests that federal law governs priority
disputes in trademarks. The creation of trademark rights has
traditionally been governed by state law; ~ Congress probably
142 Interestingly, although, the word "mortgagee" appears in 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (a
prior unrecorded assignee loses to a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee), indicating a
congressional intent to encompass security interests, the word "mortgagee" does not appear
in 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1988).
1 Federal preemption is a question of the intent of the U.S. Congress as embodied in a
federal statute. The intent of state legislators in passing the U.C.C. is inapposite.
Nonetheless, many commentators, see, e.g., Bahrick, supra note 1, at 37-39; Capwell, supra
note 3, at 155; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 3, at 205; and even some courts, see, eg.,
In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985), make the mistake of looking to
the U.C.C. and Professor Gilmore's treatise in order to answer questions of federal
preemption. Such sources are very helpful in determining the intent of state legislators in
passing the U.C.C., but they do not bear on the preliminary question of whether Congress
intended
federal law to apply.
1
"See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
1The Lanham Act provides for the federal registration of trademarks used in interstate
commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988), remedies for trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(1988), and federal jurisdiction for trademark disputes; however, the initial question of
whether trademark rights exist or not is a question of state law. For example, a federal
registration is not a complete defense to an infringement suit brought by the owner of an
unregistered mark. See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.
1968) (allowing user of unregistered mark "Burger King" to prevail over owner of federally
registered mark "Burger King" in limited geographic area). Registration carries with it
prima facie evidence of ownership, but the ultimate question of priority of ownership is
determined by state law. I&
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intended for the creation of security interests in those rights to be
governed by state law also. If "assignment" does not include
security interests, then Article 9 filing requirements1 and
priority rules 147 are applicable in all cases. 1" These rules are
amply described elsewhere and will not be restated here.",9
CONCLUSION

Resolving priority disputes over intellectual property collateral is
a complex task because none of the relevant federal statutes
establishes a complete framework. Answers not provided by federal
law are answered by state laws which, in the case of patent and
copyright collateral, frequently make reference back to federal filing
systems. Although the current state of the law is complex, a
careful parsing of the relevant statutes, both state and federal,
reveals a satisfactory level of clarity. In other words, answers to
most priority disputes over intellectual property collateral can be
gleaned with some certainty, although not without effort. Unfortunately, some courts and commentators have muddied these already
treacherous waters by suggesting an overly broad preemption of
state law, by erroneously augmenting the power of the bankruptcy
trustee, and by generally failing to provide adequate reasoning to
support what may be a correct result.
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Copyright Act, Patent
Act, and Lanham Act should only preempt state laws when a direct
conflict exists. When federal law provides a clear answer to a
dispute, a contrary state law is inoperative. On the other hand,
when federal law does not resolve a priority contest, state law
should provide the rule of decision. Therefore, contrary to recent
copyright cases, state law ultimately determines who prevails
between an unperfected secured party and a bankruptcy trustee,

14 See U.C.C. §§ 9-401, -402 (1990) (filing in proper place and filing sufficient statement
is required to perfect security interest).
", See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -312 (1990) (generally, unperfected security interest is
subordinate to perfected security interest, lien creditor's interest, or to transferee for value
without knowledge).
'46 Keeping in mind, of course, the multiple filings that may be necessary to perfect an
interest in the trademark and good will.
" See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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and contrary to recent patent cases, the application of state law
results in the trustee's power to avoid an interest not recorded in
the PTO. Other recent cases resolving disputes over trademark
collateral, although rightly decided, fail to recognize the differences
between patents and trademarks that would have led Congress to
maintain state law in force. If an acceptable level of predictability
is to be attained, a consistent framework for deciding priority
disputes in intellectual property collateral, preferably along the
lines suggested herein, must be administered by the courts.
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